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Abstract. – We propose a model of a competing population whose agents have a tendency to
balance their decisions in time. We find phase transitions to oscillatory behavior, explainable by
the aggregation of agents into two groups. On a longer time scale, we find that the aggregation
of smart agents is able to explain the lifetime distribution of epochs to 8 decades of probability.
Many natural and artificial systems involve interacting agents, each making independent
decisions to pursue their own short-term objectives, but globally exhibiting long-time correla-
tions beyond the memory sizes or the action cycles of the individuals [1–3]. Examples include
the price fluctuations in financial markets [4], traffic patterns on the Internet [5], and the
lifespan and metabolic time scales of living organisms. It is interesting to consider the extent
to which the inherent properties of the systems can affect the temporal behavior. Correla-
tions beyond individual memory sizes can be consequences of interaction among agents. For
example, some agents may find it advantageous to correlate their decisions over an extended
period of time, leading to the emergence of epochs dominated by a group. This constitutes
a system with multiple time scales. On a long time scale, it is described by the ages of the
epochs, besides the shorter time scale of the underlying dynamics (usually determined by the
memory sizes or the action cycles of the agents).
In this Letter, we analyze a competing population model with the above features. The
model is most applicable to financial markets in which agents trade with finite capital, but
can be extended to other multiagent systems such as routers in communication networks
attempting to transmit multiclass traffic in a fair way. In an effort to avoid overdrawing
her capital, an agent making a buying decision at an instant is more inclined to make a
subsequent selling decision, and vice versa. This creates a natural short-time scale for the
buy-and-sell cycles of the market. To model the adaptive attributes of the agents, each agent
can occasionally revise her decision by following some adaptive strategy she perceives to be
successful, analogous to the Minority Game (MG) [3]. We are interested in studying how
agents aggregate in their decision making process in the short as well as long time scales.
Specifically, we consider a population of N agents competing to maximize their individual
utility, while striving to maintain a balance of their capital, N being odd. At each time step
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t, agent i makes a bid bi(t) = 1 or 0, and the minority group among the N agents wins. “1”
and “0” may represent “buy” and “sell” decisions in a financial market. To model agents
with concerns for both finite capital and adatpive strategies, agent i makes buying bids with
probabilities P [bi(t) = 1], where
P [bi(t) = 1] = kf(ci(t)) + (1− k)Pstrategy[bi(t) = 1], (1)
where 0 ≤ k ≤ 1 is the restoring strength determining the statistical weights of the two factors
in Eq. (1).
The first term models the consideration of finite capital in an agent’s buying decisions at
time t, whose probabilities increase with her capital ci(t) at the instant. For example, we
choose in this Letter a three-step function f(ci(t)) which is equal to 0, 1/2 and 1 respectively
in the ranges 0 ≤ ci(t) < c<, c< ≤ ci(t) < c>, and c> ≤ ci(t) ≤ 1. For a buying bid, the
capital reduces by (1 − α)ci(t), in exchange for the same value of stocks (to the lowest order
approximation, we have neglected price changes due to fluctuations in supply and demand).
Similarly, for a selling bid, the volume of stocks reduces by (1− α)[1− ci(t)], in exchange for
the same value of capital. Thus, the capital change is given by
ci(t+ 1) = αci(t) + (1− α)[1 − bi(t)]. (2)
In Eq. (2), the second term counts the number of selling bids in history at a value of 1 − α,
and the first term shows that its effect on the capital is discounted exponentially at a rate of
α per step. Hence, α is referred to as the restoring memory factor. Small α corresponds to
short-term restoring, namely, balancing buying and selling in small number of steps, whereas
large α corresponds to long-term restoring. When there are more selling (buying) bids in
the recent bid history, the capital tends to be high (low). Through the probability f(ci(t)),
the agent tends to balance the more frequent recent bids with the opposite actions. This is
equivalent to adding a restoring force to the decision making process of the agents.
The second term models an agent’s tendency to use adaptive strategies, and the proba-
bility Pstrategy[bi(t) = 1] can be determined by standard games such as the MG [3] or the
Evolutionary Minority Game (EMG) [6]. In MG, strategies are binary functions mapping an
m-bit signal to an output bit, the signal here being the winning bits of the most recent m
steps. Before the game starts, each agent randomly picks s strategies. At each time step,
the cumulative payoffs of strategies that give a correct prediction increase by 1, while those
predicting incorrectly decrease by 1. Each agent then follows the strategy with the highest
cumulative payoff among those she owns. The EMG differs from the MG in details, but shares
the same feature that the adopted strategies evolve according to historical performances.
The system behaviour is characterized by the variance of buyers at the steady state. In
the simulations, all agents initially hold equal value of capital and stocks, and the cumulative
payoffs of strategies in MG are randomized with variance R [7]. Remarkably, Fig. 1(a) shows
that the system behaviour crosses over from a strategy-specific regime at k = 0 to a memory-
factor-specific regime when k approaches 1. In the latter regime, the variances approach values
dependent on α, irrespective of the type of the adaptive strategies (such as in MG or EMG).
Thus in the strongly restoring limit, the system behavior remains the same for a given value
of α, as long as some adaptive strategy is adopted. For large α in the strongly restoring limit,
the restoring force tends to bring the variance of the system to the coin-toss limit σ2/N = 1/4,
implying that the agents make random and uncorrelated decisions. For small α in the same
limit, the variance has a value lower than the coin-toss limit. Note that the variances in the
limit k approaching 1 jumps discontinuously to the coin-toss limit at k=1 (that is, when the
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Fig. 1 – (a) The variance as a function of the restoring strength k (N = 101, 50,000 steps, 1,000
samples; for MG, R = 51, s = 2). (b) The variance as a function of the restoring memory factor α at
k = 0.99 and αc = 2/3. Inset: The distribution of capital for different α indicated in the legend.
decisions are solely based on the concern for finite capital), showing that adaptive strategies,
even only rarely used by the agents, are essential in bringing the system to an efficient state.
Figure 1(b) shows the variance in the strongly restoring limit, which increases with the
restoring memory factor α. It undergoes a continuous phase transition to the coin-toss limit
at a critical α, whose value is independent of the type of adaptive strategies. The nature
of this transition is revealed in the distribution of capital at a steady-state instant of the
system, which has two sharp peaks in the short-term memory phase, but one otherwise (Fig.
1(b) inset). The two-peaked distribution arises from the intentions of the agents to balance
their budget in a small number of steps, causing them to aggregate into two groups, A and
B, analogous to the crowd-anticrowd picture of multiagent systems [8]. Group A consists
of agents making alternating buy and sell bids at odd and even time steps respectively, and
agents in group B make opposite alternating bids. This self-organization of agent behavior
is further confirmed by the spectrum of a Fast Fourier Transform of the capital of a typical
agent, which shows a sharp peak at the frequency 0.5. In fact, one can show from Eq. (1) that
when α < αc ≡ min[c</(1 − c<), (1 − c>)/c>], a limit cycle of period 2 can be formed from
the alternating bids of an agent. This enables the capital of an agent to avoid staying in the
intermediate region (c<, c>) of random bids, resulting in a segregated phase with two groups
of agents. The value of αc coincides with the phase transition point in Fig. 1(b). In contrast,
for α > αc, there appears a growing fraction of agents in the region of random bids, and the
period-2 dynamics is not sustained, resulting in a clustered phase with a coin-tossed variance.
We note in passing that segregated and clustered behavior have been observed in a model of
EMG due to a different cause [9], but the issue of time scales has not been studied.
We now consider temporal effects beyond the period-2 oscillations, focusing on the limit
k approaching 1 in the segregated phase. At each time step, an average of (1 − k)N ≡ k˜
agents make decisions according to adaptive strategies, and thus have a chance to switch from
group A to B, or vice versa. Then, groups A and B change from majority to minority, or vice
versa, in a time scale longer than the period-2 oscillations. The emergence of these multiple
time scales is illustrated in Fig. 2, in which the buyer population is essentially oscillating
with period-2. Occasional phase slips in the buyer population signify switches from group A
being the winners to group B, or vice versa. This corresponds to instants in Fig. 2 where the
population of group A crosses the minority-majority boundary. The lifetime of an epoch is
the duration for which group A or B remains winning continuously.
To analyze the variance and the epoch lifetimes, we note that since the history is dominated
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Fig. 2 – The population size of the buyers and group A for a particular sample (N = 101, m = 1,
s = 2, R = 51, k = 0.99, α = 0.4, 10,000 steps).
by period-2 oscillations, there is a reduction in the effective dimensionality of the dynamics.
This greatly simplifies the analysis of the dynamics, rendering it generally applicable to MGs
of arbitrary memory size m. Indeed, the two most common signals received by the agents are
the series of alternating “0” and “1” (e.g. “0101” and “1010” in the case ofm = 4), referred to
as the epoch steady signals (ES signals). After the firstm−1 steps since their birth, the epochs
enter the epoch steady state (ES state), in which the switching of agents between groups A
and B are determined by their responses to the ES signals. Thus, there are 4 categories of
strategies according to their response to the ES signals: followers, whose decision follows the
last bit of the ES signals; sellers, whose decision is 0; buyers, whose decision is 1; contrarian,
whose decision is opposite to the last bit of the ES signals.
For small k˜ such that 〈L〉 & m, the ES signals are the most frequent ones, causing the
contrarian strategies to acquire the highest cumulative payoffs, and the follower strategies the
lowest. The buyer and seller strategies predict correctly half of the times in the ES state,
and their cumulative payoffs are intermediate. At the ES state, the agents making minority
strategic decisions are those holding at least one contrarian strategy. They are referred to as
smart agents. The probability of finding a smart agent is 1− (3/4)s. Otherwise, if agents have
at least one of the buyer or seller strategy, their strategic bid follows the minority decision in
the ES state with probability 1/2, and are referred to as mediocre agents. The probability of
this case is (3/4)s−(1/4)s. With probability (1/4)s, the agents only have follower strategies at
hand, and their strategic bid follows the majority decision in the ES state. They are referred
to as the dump agents. On average, the probability of an agent bidding for the minority
decision in the ES state is TES = 1− (3/4)
s/2− (1/4)s/2.
The analysis of the first m − 1 steps, referred to as the epoch transient state (ET state),
is more involved. In this case, the smart agents are no longer receiving the ES signals that
they are most adapted to. In particular, for those smart agents who hold only one contrarian
strategy, the payoff of the contrarian strategy is accumulated owing to its successful responses
to the dominant ES signals, irrespective of their responses to the ET signals. Thus, their
average probability of making a minority decision is 1/2. On the other hand, for those smart
agents who hold more than one contrarian strategies, the payoffs of the contrarian strategies
are accumulated to the same extent in the ES state, and the ET signals are able to favour
the payoff accumulation of those contrarian strategies that predict the correct minority bit in
the ES state. These agents, who adapt to the ES state as well as partially to the ET state,
are referred to as the super-smart agents. Their probability of making a minority decision is
Tsuper, whose average value can be shown to be greater then 1/2 [10], using a self-consistent
and semi-empirical approach through an analysis of the historical occurrence of signals, or
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Fig. 3 – Lifetime 〈L〉 as a function of k˜. (s = 2, R = 51, α = 0.4, 30,000 steps with 2,000 samples)
compared with the mean-rate and multirate approximations. Reference: 〈L〉 = 5k˜−1. Inset: Variance
σ2 as a function of k˜.
an approximation that all ET signals have the same probability of occurrence. Similarly,
there are super-mediocre agents who hold more than one buyer or seller strategies. Since
all dump agents hold more than one follower strategies, they can also be called super-dump
agents. Their average probability of making a minority decision is also Tsuper, in contrast to
the probability of 1/2 for the rest of the population. On average, the probability of an agent
bidding for the minority decision in the ET state is TET = fsuperTsuper+(1− fsuper)/2, where
fsuper = 1− (s/4)(3/4)
s−1 − (s/2)(1/4)s−1.
We first analyze the dynamics in the mean-rate approximation. The average probability
that an agent uses an adaptive strategy and switches side at time t is, respectively, (1−k)T (t)
from majority to minority, and (1− k)(1− T (t)) in the opposite direction, where T (t) = TES
and TET in the ES and ET states respectively. The master equation for the distribution of
the number N
A
of agents in group A can then be solved numerically or by Monte Carlo.
As shown in Fig. 3, the average epoch lifetime 〈L〉 decreases with the average number k˜ of
agents using adaptive strategies. When k˜ approaches 0, 〈L〉 appears to approach the expected
result of 〈L〉 ∼ k˜−1. This implies that during the average lifetime of an epoch, an average of
k˜〈L〉 ≈ 5 agents make strategic decisions which may result in switching sides. Furthermore,
the prediction of the mean-rate approximation has an excellent agreement with the simulation
results. A similarly excellent agreement is shown in Fig. 3 inset for the variance σ2. When
k˜ approaches 0, the master equation for P (N
A
) can be approximated by a Markov chain,
yielding P (NA) ∼ [(1 − TES)/TES]
|N
A
−(N+1)/2| and a variance of 2[(1 − TES)/(2TES − 1)]
2 +
2[(1− TES)/(2TES − 1)] + 1/4.
Figure 4 shows that the epoch lifetimes follow an exponential distribution near its max-
imum at small L. The exponential decay rate depends on k˜ and is insensitive to N . The
mean-rate approximation has an excellent agreement with simulation results in this regime.
When L increases further, the distribution crosses over to an exponential one with a lower
decay rate dependent on both k˜ and N . However, the mean-rate approximation predicts a
lower distribution of long epochs than simulations. As shown in Fig. 4 inset, the decay rates of
both the simulation and the mean-rate approximation approaches the same asymptotic value
for large N , but their differences are significant in the mesoscopic regime. Analysis shows that
the differences scale as N−1.1±0.1.
The discrepancy arises from the inability of the mean-rate approximation to differentiate
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Fig. 4 – Lifetime distribution (s = 2, R = 51, k = 0.99, α = 0.4, 30,000 steps with 30,000 samples)
compared with the mean-rate and multirate approximations. Inset: decay rate of long epochs as a
function of N for m = 1.
the aggregation effects of various agents in the majority and minority groups. Suppose it
happens that the majority group in an epoch consists of less smart agents than the minority
group. It follows that when an agent in the majority group chooses to make a strategic
decision, it is less likely that she switches to the minority group. The converse is valid for
dump agents, but to a lesser extent due to their smaller population. This reduces the flow of
agents from the majority to the minority group, and hence lengthen the lifespan of an epoch.
This effect is most significant in the mesoscopic regime when the fluctuations of the smart
agent aggregate and the minority group size are important.
The evidence that smart agents aggregate in the minority group at the expense of the
majority group is demonstrated in Fig. 5. We measure the difference in the number of smart
agents between the minority and majority groups (Nmin,s − Nmaj,s) averaged over an epoch.
Compared with the distribution for short epochs, the peak of the distribution for long epochs
is shifted to the positive side. This shows that long epochs have more smart agents distributed
in the minority group on average.
This leads to the second approximation of our analysis, the multirate approximation. We
denote by NAs, NAm and NAd the number of smart, mediocre and dump agents in group
A respectively. Instead of using a single average probability of switching from the majority
to the minority group for all agents and vice versa, the average transition probabilities for
each of these agent types is taken into account. The master equation for the probability
P (NAs, NAm, NAd) can be solved by Monte Carlo. As shown in Fig. 4, the multirate approxi-
mation yields a significantly higher probability for long epochs compared with the mean-rate
approximation, resulting in an excellent agreement with simulation results over 8 decades of
probability. Furthermore, the distribution of smart agents derived from the multirate approx-
imation has an excellent agreement with simulation results, as shown in Fig. 5. This shows
that the aggregation of smart agents is crucial in explaining the occurrence of long epochs.
Due to their generic nature, effects of smart agent aggregation are expected to be present
for adaptive strategies other than MG strategies. The essence is the stabilization of the
minority group by the smart agents, whose strategies are favored by the sustenance of an
epoch. Note that the smart agents do not have any intrinsic preference to either group A or
B; they favor the group they aggregate in as long as it is the minority. Differences among the
various adaptive strategies only come from details of the transition rate between the majority
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and minority groups.
In summary, we have proposed a model of a competing population with multiple time
scales. When the tendency to balance the decisions of the agents is strong, changing their
intentions from long-term to short-term induces phase transitions to oscillations with two
groups of agents making alternating but opposite decisions, and the behavior is independent
of the details of the adaptive strategies. On a longer time scale, the history is characterized
by epochs dominated by one of the two groups. Epochs end when sufficient numbers of
agents follow adaptive strategies and switch to the winning side. Epochs are stabilized by the
aggregation of smart agents on the winning side in the mesoscopic regime. The study of epoch
lifetime is important to the agents who want to stay on the winning side as long as possible,
or at least to have a knowledge of how long they would prevail. These generic features
are relevant to multiagent systems such as financial markets of agents with finite capital,
distributed control of multiclass traffic in communication networks, and other systems with
competing aggregates of agents.
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